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Abstract: This paper investigates the implications of vertical ﬁscal externalities for the
optimal federal tax and the sign of ﬁscal gap in the presence of ad valorem taxation.
It is shown that the federal government can always achieve the second-best optimum
for public good provision. The sign of the ﬁscal gap is, in general, ambiguous. The
consequence of this is that a precise evaluation of the ﬁscal gap requires an explicit
consideration of the underlying fundamentals of the federal economy.
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A common feature of federal ﬁscal systems is the ﬁscal gap: transfer of funds between
levels of governments. Boadway and Keen (1996), in a framework of labor speciﬁc
taxation, show the possibility of the ﬁscal gap to be negative requiring a transfers of
resources from the states to the federal government. This result is intuitive. In federal
systems, tax base co-occupancy by levels of government create negative vertical (between
levels) ﬁscal externalities.1 To undo such externalities, and achieve second-best eﬃciency
in public good provision, the federal government sets a negative (speciﬁc) labor tax. This
creates a need of resources that, in the absence of other revenues, must come from other
levels of government.
This paper extends the contribution of Boadway and Keen (1996) by considering ad
valorem taxation. As shown by Dahlby and Wilson (2003), and reconﬁrmed here, under
ad valorem taxation the vertical externality can be of any sign. It is the implication of
this, not explored by Dahlby and Wilson (2003), for the optimal federal tax and the sign
of the ﬁscal gap that we are concerned with here. The analytics show that the federal
government can always replicate the second-best unitary outcome. Interestingly, the
sign of the federal optimal tax, in contrast to the case of speciﬁc taxation analyzed by
Boadway and Keen (1996), crucially depends on the elasticity of the demand for labor.
It is also shown that the direction of intergovernmental transfers can be towards either
level of government, and so is, in general, ambiguous. The consequence of this is that a
precise evaluation of the ﬁscal gap requires an explicit consideration of the underlying
fundamentals of the federal economy.
2 The background of the model
The model is one of federal ﬁscal interactions, familiar from Boadway and Keen (1996),
appropriately modiﬁed to deal with issues of ad valorem taxation. The model features
a federal economy with k (symmetric) states, populated by nk identical, but immobile,
households. The representative household has utility of the form u(x,l) + b(g) + B(G),
where x is a private good (and numeraire), l is labor, and g and G are state and federal
public goods, respectively. The sub-utility u(x,l) is quasi-concave, increasing in x and
decreasing in l. Both b(g) and B(G) are increasing and concave.
The local public good g provided by each state government is ﬁnanced by taxing, at the
rate t, labor income wl, where w denotes the gross wage rate. The federal government
1See, for instance, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002).
1provides the federal public good G, ﬁnanced by taxing labor income at the rate T.
Consolidated taxation is denoted by τ ≡ t + T.
The representative consumer maximizes u(x,l) + b(g) + B(G) subject to the constraint
x = ¯ wl, where ¯ w = (1 − τ)w is net wage. Labor supply, denoted by l( ¯ w), is implicitly
deﬁned by ux( ) ¯ w+ul( ) = 0.2 It is assumed that l′( ¯ w) > 0. Indirect utility is then given
by v( ¯ w) = u( ¯ wl( ¯ w),l( ¯ w)) with, as an envelope property, v′ = uxl. Output in each state
is produced by technology f(nl), which has the usual properties f′ > 0 > f′′. Output
can be costlessly used for x, g and G.
The private sector maximizes proﬁts, given by π = f(nl) − wnl, and thus chooses labor
demand that satisﬁes f′(nl) = w. This latter condition, since l( ¯ w), implicitly deﬁnes
the equilibrium gross wage rate w((1 − τ),n) with, after denoting by z ≡ l′ ¯ w/l > 0 the







(with the inequality following from w > 0 and 0 < τ < 1). Net wage ¯ w = (1 − τ)w((1 −
τ),n), following (1), gives




Notice, for later use, that the eﬀect of taxation, state and/or federal, on the (gross) value
of labor, denoted by r((1 − τ),n) = w((1 − τ),n)l( ¯ w), is given by
rτ = wτl + wl





l(1 + ǫ), (3)
and so its sign depends upon the elasticity of labor demand ǫ. We turn to this shortly
below.
Proﬁts (rents) π are taxable by the federal government, at a ﬁxed rate θ, and by the
state governments at the rate of (1 − θ).3 Notice, for later use, that diﬀerentiation of π,
after using (1), gives






Denoting by S the vertical transfer, the state public good is given by
g(t,T,τ,S,n,θ) = tnr((1 − τ),n) + (1 − θ)π((1 − τ),n) + S, (5)
2A subscript denotes the derivative of a function of several variables whereas a prime denotes the
derivative of a function of one variable.
3The allocation of rents for the level of taxation is of course important. See, for instance, Kotsogiannis
and Makris (2002). We return to this, brieﬂy, in Section 3.
2with, after using (3),
gt = nr + tnrτ + (1 − θ)πτ, (6)
gT = tnrτ + (1 − θ)πτ, (7)
gS = 1. (8)
From (6) and (7), it can be readily seen that
gt = gT + wnl. (9)
Federal public good provision is given by
G(t,T,τ,S,n,θ) = Tknr((1 − τ),n) + kθπ((1 − τ),n) − kS, (10)
with
GT = knr + Tknrτ + kθπτ, (11)
Gt = Tknrτ + kθπτ, (12)
GS = −k < 0. (13)
Notice, from (11) and (12), that
GT = knwl + Gt. (14)
Equation (12), central to the present analysis, gives the vertical externality caused by







[T (1 + ǫ) − θ], (15)
which takes the sign of T(1 + ǫ) − θ. This, thus, shows that—contrary to the case of
speciﬁc taxation considered by Boadway and Keen (1996) in which this externality is
unambiguously negative5—under ad valorem taxation the vertical ﬁscal externalitty can
be positive. It is the implication of this for the level of federal taxation and the sign of
the ﬁscal gap that is our focus here.
The analysis now proceeds by exploring the equilibrium outcome pursued by a unitary
country. This will serve as a benchmark so the equilibrium alternative, that of when
ﬁscal policies are pursued by both levels of government, can be compared with.
Equilibrium in a unitary country involves maximization of v( ¯ w)+b(g)+B(G), choosing
τ,G,g, subject to the consolidated budget constraint G + kg = τknr((1 − τ),n) +
4Equation (15) conﬁrms, for the case in which k = n = 1, the result in Dahlby and Wilson (2003).
5This implies that state speciﬁc-taxes are too high from an equilibrium point of view.
3kπ((1 − τ),n). It is straightforward to verify that the necessary conditions yield the












which simply states that at the unitary optimum the ad valorem tax τ is set such that the
sum of the marginal rate of substitution between both the federal and state public goods
and the private good x must be equal to the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF),
given by 1/(1 − (τwl′/l)). Equations (16) together with the unitary budget constraint
characterize the unitary second-best optimum.
We turn now to the characterization of the equilibrium in which ﬁscal policy is pursued
by both levels of government. This equilibrium focuses on the case in which the federal
government has a ﬁrst mover advantage vis ` a vis the state governments. Each state gov-
ernment holds Nash conjectures relative to the federal and all other state governments.
3 Characterization of the equilibrium
The typical state chooses (t,g) to maximize v( ¯ w) + b(g) + B(G) subject to (5), taking
as given the decision variables of the federal government, (T,S,G,n,θ). The necessary
condition of this problem is given by
v
′ ¯ wτ + b
′gt = 0 ≡ Ω(t,T,S,n,θ), (17)
which implicitly deﬁnes t(T,S;θ,n) with, in particular,
tT = −1 +




′′gt/Ωt ≤ 0, (19)
where Ωt < 0 is the second order condition of the state government maximization prob-
lem.
The federal government maximizes v( ¯ w)+b(g(t,T,τ,S,θ,n))+B(G(t,T,τ,S,n,θ)) sub-
ject to t(T,S,n,θ) choosing appropriately T,S (and residually G). The necessary con-
ditions for T and S being, respectively,
v
′ ¯ wτ(1 + tT) + b
′ (gT + gttT) + B
′ (GT + GttT) = 0, (20)
v
′ ¯ wτtS + b
′ (gS + gttS) + B
′ (GS + GttS) = 0. (21)












4Equation (22) is central to this analysis. It shows how the MCPF for the federal govern-
ment relates to that of the state governments.6 If it happens to be that Gt(1 + tT) < 0
then the MCPF for the federal government exceeds that of the state governments. But
if it is the case that Gt(1 + tT) > 0 then the state MCPF exceeds that of the federal.
Though, as already noted after (15), the sign of Gt can be determined, close inspection
of (18) reveals that the sign of 1+tT (and so Gt(1+tT)) is in general ambiguous.7 This
has an important implication for the direction of intergovernmental transfer S to which
we now turn.
The choice of the transfers S satisﬁes (21). Evaluating (21), using (17) and multiplying











GttS = 0. (23)
Equation (23) determines the direction of the intergovernmental transfer S in the pres-
ence of the vertical externality. The terms within the parentheses capture the diﬀerence
in MCPF between the state and federal public goods. They simply say that the transfer
should go from the government with the lower MCPF to the one with the higher MCPF.
The last term in (23), that points to the opposite direction, captures the eﬀect of the
transfer on the extent of the vertical externality. To see this suppose that the state
MCPF is greater than the federal MCPF (and so the federal public good is too high
because of a positive vertical externality Gt) then the transfer should go from the federal
government to the state governments. But the transfer will aﬀect state taxation too and,
therefore, the extent of the vertical externality. So, following (19), the transfer, since
GttS < 0, will reduce the vertical externality. At the optimum, of course, (19) will hold
with equality. Analogous reasoning applies to the case in which Gt < 0.
Combining (22) with (23) it is straightforward to show that the optimal federal tax is
characterized by Gt = 0 which, following from (22), replicates the unitary optimum in
(16). Following from (15), the optimal federal tax is given by
T
∗ = θ/(1 + ǫ), (24)
6Though the optimality condition in (22) is expressed in terms of the marginal rate of substitution
between public (federal and state) and private consumption its interpretation is in terms of the MCPF
(federal and state). The beneﬁt from doing this is that a simple comparison of (16) and (22) reveals the
source of ineﬃciency at the level of state taxation. This interpretation is also followed after (23).
7The elasticity of labor demand ǫ being a critical factor. To see this notice that, as noted earlier, if
labor demand is elastic then, following (3), rτ < 0 and so, with b′′, ¯ wτ,Ωt < 0, 1 + tT > 0. But if labor
demand is inelastic then rτ > 0 and 1 + tT may take a negative sign (a possibility that does not make
appearance in the case of speciﬁc taxation of Bodaway and Keen (1996)). Such ambiguity appears also
in capital taxation models: see, for instance, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003).
5and so, with θ > 0, its sign depends on the elasticity of the demand for labor ǫ. Com-
parison of (15) and (24) reveals that if the demand for labor is elastic then Gt < 0 and
so, since T ∗ < 0, the federal government subsidies labor. If, on the other hand, it is
inelastic, a necessary condition for Gt > 0, then the federal government sets T ∗ > 0 and
so taxes labor. To summarize:
Proposition 1 The federal government always replicates the second-best optimum with
the appropriate choice of the federal ad valorem tax T ∗ = θ/(1 + ǫ). More speciﬁcally,
(a) if the demand for labor is elastic, and thus the vertical externality is negative,
then the federal government subsidizes labor income.
(b) If the demand for labor is inelastic, a necessary condition for the vertical ex-
ternality to be positive, then the federal government taxes labor income.
The result behind Proposition 1 has an important implication for the sign of the intergov-
ernmental transfer. It is intuitive that such transfer will depend on a number of factors,
including the size of rents and the intensity of preferences for the public good. To see
this suppose that θ = 0 and thus the federal government has no access to revenues from
rents. In this case T ∗ = 0 and so, following from (10), the federal public expenditure
should be ﬁnanced by transfers from the state, that is the ﬁscal gap is negative. If now
G∗ = 0, and so public expenditure is worthless, then, it is clear—following again from
(10)—that the sign of the ﬁscal gap will depend upon the two federal revenue sources:
the revenues from labor tax, given by θfω/(1+ǫ) (where ω ≡ f′nl/f > 0 is the elasticity
of production with respect to employment, nl), and the revenues from rents, given by
θπ = θf(1 − ω). Clearly, with positive equilibrium proﬁts (and so 1 − ω > 0), one can
easily identify conditions under which the sign of S can be positive or negative. That
the ﬁscal gap is, in general, ambiguous might not be very surprising. What is surprising
though is that this ambiguity does not arise, in the case considered here, from a property
of the production function (as it does in the case of speciﬁc taxation of Boadway and
Keen (1996)), but merely from the elasticity of the demand for labor.
4 Concluding remarks
In a framework of federal ﬁscal interactions where taxation is of ad valorem form, this
paper has derived the optimal federal tax that allows the government to internalize the
ﬁscal externalities (positive or negative) that arise at the state level of government and
achieve the second-best level of public good provision. The analysis has also emphasized
that the ﬁscal gap is, in general, ambiguous. A precise evaluation of the ﬁscal gap requires
an explicit consideration of the underlying fundamentals of the federal economy.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Derivation of equation (16) in text.
In this Appendix we derive the optimal rule for public good provision in a second-best
environment in a unitary country.
The maximization problem for the unitary government is to maximize v( ¯ w)+b(g)+B(G),
choosing τ, G and g, and subject to the consolidated budget constraint as given by
G + kg = τkw((1 − τ),n)l((1 − τ)w((1 − τ),n)) + kπ((1 − τ),n). (A.1)
Denoting by   the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint, necessary
conditions of this maximization problem are given by
(τ) : v
′((1 − τ)wτ − w) +  A = 0, (A.2)
(G) : B
′(G) −   = 0, (A.3)
(g) : b
′(g) −  k = 0, (A.4)
where
A ≡ kwnl + τkwτnl + τkwnl
′((1 − τ)wτ − w) + kπτ, (A.5)
with πτ conveniently written as
πτ =
f′′n2l′wl
1 − f′′nl(1 − τ)
< 0. (A.6)
Notice now that (1) can be written as
wτ =
−f′′nl′w
1 − f′′nl(1 − τ)
> 0. (A.7)




Substituting (A.8) into (A.7) and that into (A.5) and simplifying, one arrives at
A ≡ kn((1 − τ)wτ − w)(τwl
′ − l). (A.9)
Making use now of the fact that v′ = uxl and (A.9), straightforward manipulation of the
ﬁrst order conditions (A.2)-(A.4) gives the second-best tax rule in (16). ￿
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Derivation of equations (18) and (19) in text.
Application of the implicit function theorem to (17) gives
Ωt = v
′′((1 − τ)wτ − w)
2 + v






′′((1 − τ)wτ − w)
2 + v
′((1 − τ)wττ − 2wτ) + b
′′gTgt + b
′gtT. (B.2)
Comparison of (B.1) and (B.2) gives
















b′′ (gTgt − (gt)2) + b′(gtT − gtt)
Ωt
. (B.6)
where the second inequality follows from substituting (B.3) into (B.4).



















′ (−w + (1 − τ)wτ)nlw)/b
′. (B.9)
We determine next the derivatives gtT and gtt in (B.6). Diﬀerentiating (6) with respect
to t and T, and comparing gives
gtT − gtt = −n(lwτ + l
′ ((1 − τ)wτ − w)w). (B.10)
Using (B.9) and (B.10) into (B.6) one arrives at (18) in text.














9where the last equality follows from (8) and the fact that gt, in equation (6), is in-
dependent of S implying gtS = 0. Equation (B.13) is then equation (19) in the text.
￿
Appendix C
Derivation of equations (22) in text.




knlw + Gt(1 + tT)
. (C.1)
Multiplying through (C.1) by n/ux , dividing the l.h.s by knlw and rearranging gives
(22). ￿
Appendix D
Derivation of equation (15).
Denote the net wage by ¯ w = (1 − τ)w. Deﬁne now the elasticity of supply for labor,
denoted by z, as in the text (that is, z ≡ l′ ¯ w/l > 0) and the elasticity of demand for
labor, denoted by ǫ, as also in the text (that is, ǫ ≡ f′/(nlf′′) < 0). Then, after using







where the inequality follows from w,z > 0, τ < 1 and ǫ < 0.
Substituting (D.1) into (2) gives











Substituting (D.1) and (D.2) into the eﬀect of state tax on the federal tax revenue only
(with T > 0) gives
Tkn(wτl + wl





(1 + ǫ), (D.4)
which can be negative or positive depending on the elasticity of demand for labor, ǫ. If
the demand for labor is inelastic (elastic) then this externality (ignoring revenues from
proﬁts for the moment) is strictly positive (negative).






[T (1 + ǫ) − θ]. (D.5)
Expression (D.5) conﬁrms the result in Dahlby and Wilson (2003) in the case in which
k = n = 1.
￿
Appendix E
Proof of the statement that the optimal tax is characterized by Gt = 0.






1 + Gt(1 + tT)/(knlw)
+
GttS















With 1+Gt(1+tT)/(knlw)  = 0 and also (assumed to be the case that) (1+tT)/(nlw)+
tS  = 0, it follows from (E.2) that Gt = 0 as claimed. ￿
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